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Abstract We contend that a candidate’s decision to exit from a U.S. presidential
nomination campaign is a function of three sets of considerations: the potential for
profile elevation, party-related costs, and updated perceptions of competitiveness.
We analyze data from eleven post-reform presidential nomination campaigns and
find support for all three considerations. Specifically, our results suggest that in
addition to candidates’ competitiveness, the decision to withdraw is a function of
candidates’ closeness to their party and ability to raise their profile. At the same
time, some of our results contradict the conventional wisdom regarding presidential
nomination campaigns, as we find no evidence that media coverage or cash on hand
directly affect the duration of a nomination candidacy.
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A defining feature of the selection of presidential nominees in the United States is
that the primary elections and caucuses used to choose delegates to the parties’
national conventions occur in a series of discrete events over an extended period of
time. At the same time, it is often clear which candidate will win their party’s
nomination before voters or caucus-goers in some states have the opportunity to
register their preferences. Moreover, most of the candidates vying for their party’s
nomination withdraw well before the last delegate selecting event has been held.
This shrinking of the candidate field is often referred to as the winnowing process.
For many candidates, however, there is a substantial lag between the recognition
that they will not win the nomination and the termination of their campaigns. This
presents scholars with an interesting theoretical puzzle: why do candidates continue
to campaign, if only for a short period of time, after it has become almost certain
they will not win the nomination? More generally, what explains why and when
candidates seeking their party’s nomination will exit from the campaign?
Given both the theoretical and substantive importance of the winnowing process,
the relative scarcity of systematic studies attempting to explain candidate
termination of nomination campaigns is somewhat surprising. Aldrich (1980), in
perhaps the first attempt to address this process (although see Matthews 1978),
argues that the winnowing of candidates is a function of the initial uncertainty
associated with the large and complex candidate fields that are the norm in the postreform era.1 The end result is that candidates who are unable to gain traction will
quickly leave the race. Steger et al.’s (2002) descriptive analysis of candidate
attrition from 1912 to 2000 supports this contention as they find that as candidate
fields have become larger in the post-reform era, winnowing has become an
important attribute of nomination competition. More recently, Norrander (2006)
models the duration of a candidate’s time in the race as being a function of variables
largely determined at the outset of the race. In particular, she points to the
curvilinear effect that fundraising has on the length of a candidacy, finding that
well-financed and poorly financed candidates appear to stay in the race longer than
those who are moderately financed. Haynes et al. (2004) do not contest the
importance of money, but focus their attention on the role that media coverage plays
in determining the likelihood of a candidate withdrawing from a race.
We build on these and other studies (e.g., Steger et al. 2004; Steger 2008) to
develop a model of candidate withdrawal that emphasizes the cost–benefit calculus
associated with entering and remaining in a presidential nomination contest.
Specifically, our model recognizes that candidates’ decisions to compete are shaped
not only by the goal of winning, but also by the potential profile-raising benefits that
may result from contesting their party’s presidential nomination (Steger et al. 2004).
At the same time, the pursuit of these benefits is likely to be tempered by party-related
costs that may result from lengthy losing nomination candidacies (Norrander 2006).
1

The post-reform era describes the nomination process beginning in 1972 after the implementation of the
McGovern–Frazer Commission guidelines that sought to take control of the nomination process away
from party bosses and put it in the hands of the party rank and file. The significance of these reforms is
that candidates were now obligated to contest the various state party caucuses and primaries to accrue the
requisite delegates needed to win the nomination (see Polsby 1983 for an extended discussion).
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The extent to which staying in the race helps candidates achieve their goals of profileraising and/or winning the nomination is also affected by campaign dynamics as we
expect that candidates will respond to retrospective and prospective indicators of their
electoral competitiveness.
We test several hypotheses drawn from this framework by estimating a model of
the withdrawal of candidates from presidential nomination campaigns from 1980 to
2008. The results of our analysis indicate that variation in the potential to improve a
candidate’s profile and variation in the party-related costs of staying in the race
affect the day-to-day likelihood of a candidate withdrawing from the race.
Furthermore, decisions to stay in the race or withdraw are affected by indicators of
competitiveness such as relative poll standings and the degree to which there is
uncertainty as to who will win the nomination. Some of our results contradict the
conventional wisdom regarding presidential nomination campaigns (e.g., Haynes
et al. 2004; Norrander 2006; Steger et al. 2004), as we find no evidence that media
coverage and the amount of cash on hand directly affect the duration of a
candidacy.

Candidate Motivations and the Decision to Continue
a Nomination Campaign
Prior investigations of post-reform presidential nomination campaigns typically
treat the vast majority of candidates as if they pursue a single goal: winning their
party’s nomination.2 This assumption may be misplaced, given that only a fraction
of the candidates contending for a nomination have a realistic chance of winning.
Furthermore, a clear frontrunner often emerges well before the first delegate has
been allocated (Cohen et al. 2008). Given the financial and opportunity costs
associated with campaigning for a major party nomination, a theory of candidate
behavior based on the assumption that all (or at least most) candidates are
exclusively motivated by winning the nomination should predict small field sizes
and quick exits from a race that appears to have been won by someone else.
Empirically, however, we see sizable candidate fields and considerable variation in
the length of time that candidates continue to vie for a nomination. Indeed, some
losing candidates never drop out of the race.
This disjuncture between theoretical prediction and empirical observation creates
an interesting puzzle. If the frontrunner coming out of the ‘‘invisible’’ or ‘‘money’’
primary (i.e., the period leading up to the Iowa caucus) wins the nomination in
nearly every instance (Adkins and Dowdle 2000, 2001a, b; Cohen et al. 2008), what
explains the continued participation of the rest of the field and the duration of these
unsuccessful campaigns?
Our contention is that not all candidates participate in nomination campaigns
with the exclusive goal of winning their party’s nomination. While at the outset
2

The exception to this statement is the treatment of ‘‘issue’’ or ‘‘advocacy’’ candidates. Some models of
nomination processes (e.g., Steger et al. 2004) allow for the possibility that some candidates are involved
in nomination campaigns in an effort to raise their national profile and draw attention to specific issues.
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candidates may have a scenario by which they believe that they can win the
nomination (Gurian 1986), we argue that candidates also enter and remain active in
order to raise their profile, nationally and within their party. In essence, a
presidential nomination bid can increase a candidate’s political capital, which can
be spent in numerous ways; on a future presidential run or to gain consideration as a
vice presidential nominee or cabinet member. And as Steger et al. (2004) suggest,
profile raising and the resulting increase in political capital also benefits ‘‘issue’’ or
‘‘advocacy’’ candidates. Candidates who seek to bring attention to a particular issue
or move the party in a certain direction will be more successful if they maximize
their national profile.
Thus, in light of these considerations, we argue that there are two types of
benefits to entering and then remaining in a presidential nomination campaign:
winning the nomination and profile elevation. Obviously, only one candidate will
enjoy the first of these benefits. Multiple candidates, however, can elevate their
profiles and build political capital. It is important to note that if a candidate were to
solely run with the hope of winning the nomination and there is any meaningful cost
to staying in the race, s/he will quickly drop out of the race when it becomes
apparent that another candidate will be the winner. On the other hand, profilemotivated candidates may continue to campaign after it becomes clear that they will
not win because it takes time to build the reputation and recognition these
candidates seek. These candidates may continue to increase their visibility and build
political capital even as it becomes apparent that they will not become the nominee.
With this pair of candidate motivations in mind, we contend that the decision to
exit from a nomination campaign will be a function of three sets of considerations.
First, the likelihood of a candidate withdrawing from the race on a given day will be
smaller (and thus, candidacy duration will be longer) for candidates who have more
to gain, and are gaining, in terms of profile elevation. Second, candidates will be
more likely to drop out (and thus, candidacy duration will be shorter) if they face
greater costs in terms of damage to the party and their reputation within the party
(Norrander 2006). The third set of considerations affecting the duration of
nomination candidacies focus on changes in candidates’ assessments of their
competitiveness. Both the likelihood of winning the nomination and the ability to
profile-raise will depend upon the extent to which a candidate is competitive.
The Profile-Raising Benefit of Continuing a Candidacy
The ability of candidates to use their candidacies to raise their profiles will vary
depending upon a candidate’s initial profile. A nomination campaign offers fewer
profile-raising benefits to candidates who already have high profiles. Low-profile
candidates, however, can benefit greatly if they can raise their profiles through a
moderately successful nomination campaign. Thus, we hypothesize that candidates
with high initial profile levels will terminate their candidacies more quickly than
candidates with low initial profiles, all else equal. Put in duration model terms, we
expect high profile candidates to have a greater hazard of withdrawing from the race
on a given day.
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The extent to which staying in a nomination race raises the profile of a candidate
should also depend on the amount of media coverage a candidate is able to attract.
While the media is not the only source of information about the candidates, for
many voters the media serve as an important source. The more that the media is
covering a candidate, the more there will be profile-raising benefits associated with
staying in the race. Thus, our second hypothesis is that as recent media coverage of
a candidate increases this will decrease the hazard of the candidate withdrawing
from the race (Haynes et al. 2004).
The Cost of Continuing a Losing Candidacy
While there may be benefits to remaining in a presidential nomination race past the
point at which it is apparent that another candidate will be the eventual nominee,
there also may be significant costs to staying in the race too long. For our purposes,
the most significant costs are any potential damage to either the eventual nominee’s
general election prospects or a candidate’s reputation within the party.
The cost associated with this former consideration stems from the possibility that
forcing the presumed winner-to-be to continue campaigning against a fellow
partisan, instead of turning his or her sights and resources to the likely opponent in
the general election, may undermine the party’s prospects in November.3 To the
extent that it is perceived that a losing candidate’s continuation in the nomination
race hurts the party in the general election, this candidate’s reputation in the party
will be diminished. Indeed, Norrander (2006, p. 504) finds that all else equal,
‘‘traditional candidates’’ (defined as those who have held high elective office) who
are more closely tied to their party’s mainstream ‘‘find it more rational to exit the
presidential contest to maintain cordial relations with party elites and their fellow
partisans in the government.’’ Moreover, as the work of Cohen et al. (2008) suggests,
party costs and remaining in the good graces of party elites and other ‘‘policy
demanders’’ may be a significant factor in candidates’ decision making given the
prominent role that these actors play in shaping perceptions of candidate viability.
At the same time, the value of intra-party reputation varies according to the
degree that candidates are connected to their political party. Candidates who are
closely connected to their party will pay a greater cost for maintaining a losing
nomination bid because they care more about both their party’s prospects in the
general election and their reputation within the party. Party outsiders will be less
concerned about maintaining a reputation within their party and not as worried
about hurting a mainstream candidate’s chances of winning the general election. We
hypothesize that the more closely connected a candidate is to his or her party, the
greater the hazard of ending his or her candidacy on a given day.
Our argument here is consistent with Steger (2008) and Steger et al.’s (2004)
contentions about the behavior of advocacy candidates. Because these candidates
3

Scholarly work on the effect of divisive primaries on general election outcomes yields mixed results.
Kenney and Rice (1987) and Lengle et al. (1995) find evidence that a divisive primary hurts the eventual
nominee’s performance in the general election while Atkeson (1998) and Stone et al. (1992) find that
divisive primaries have little effect if any. To some extent, it does not matter what the data indicate. What
is significant is that political elites believe that such an effect exists (see Kenney and Rice 1987).
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seek to alter their party’s agenda and often serve as an outlet for primary voters who
are dissatisfied with the other candidates in the field (Norrander 2000; Steger 2008)
and perhaps, the direction of the party more generally, they cannot be considered
part of the party mainstream. Thus, those deemed as advocacy or non-traditional
candidates by others fit into our framework as candidates who are not particularly
connected to their party, care less about party-associated costs, and as a result, will
remain in the race longer than those strongly connected to the party.
Dynamic Perceptions of Competitiveness and the Certainty of Losing
Thus far, we have discussed the costs and benefits of continuing a nomination
campaign largely in terms of static candidate characteristics, (i.e., they are fixed for
a given candidate in a particular nomination campaign). Consistent with prior work
(Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988; Haynes et al. 2004), we also expect that candidates
will respond to dynamic indicators of their competitiveness in the race. More
accurately, candidates want to be competitive and want to be perceived by others
(e.g., the media or party elites) as competitive. Indeed, competitiveness matters for
both of the motivations underlying candidacies laid out above. Competitiveness
indicates the likelihood of winning the nomination and also increases a candidate’s
ability to develop name recognition and otherwise profile-raise. Put simply, the
more competitive candidates are the longer they will stay in the race.
The ability to assess competitiveness necessitates that candidates have access to
relevant information. On this front, we contend that candidates will rely on both
retrospective and prospective indicators to assess their competitiveness. There are at
least two important retrospective indicators of competitiveness. The first of these is
recent electoral outcomes. While a candidate’s performance in one state is not a
perfect predictor of performance in another state, it is a reasonable predictor of
future outcomes.4 We hypothesize that a candidate will be less likely to exit from
the race when he or she wins or finishes close to the winner of the most recent
primary contest. Candidates who do not fare well in the most recent contests will be
perceived by themselves and others as not being competitive and will more quickly
drop out.
How well a candidate is faring in the formal allocation of delegates is a second
retrospective indicator of competitiveness. The more delegates secured by a
candidate, the better their prospects of winning the nomination or at least appearing
to be a serious contender. Accordingly, we expect that greater delegate tallies will
decrease the likelihood of candidacy termination while weak or non-existent
delegate totals will increase this likelihood.
Regardless of past performance, we expect prospective evaluations of competitiveness will also influence whether a candidate chooses to continue campaigning
or withdraw from the race. The size of the candidate field at time t is the bluntest

4

See Bartels (1988) for an in-depth discussion of the role of momentum in presidential nomination
contests.
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indicator of prospective performance.5 All else equal, the more competitors a
candidate faces the less likely the candidate is to win electoral contests and the
quicker the candidate will drop out. The relative position of a candidate in the
national polls provides additional, finer-grained information about how a candidate
is likely to perform in subsequent contests. Better poll standings will cause
candidates to extend their campaigns as they forecast positive electoral outcomes in
the near future.
Given the importance that money plays in candidates’ abilities to campaign
(Norrander 2006), candidates will also consider their available resources. The more
money a campaign has at its disposal, the more competitive a candidate will be in
future contests (Aldrich 1980; Haynes et al. 1997; Steger et al. 2004). Or put
differently, available cash reserves indicate not only candidates’ relative positions at
a given point in time, but also their ability to improve their positions by successfully
competing in subsequent contests. Thus, as Steger et al. (2004) and Norrander
(2006) note, the ability to raise funds in and of itself does not mean that candidates’
will be able to improve their standings, particularly if campaign funds are allocated
poorly. Instead, it is candidates who have successfully managed their financial
resources that will be in a better position to reach their goals and therefore, will be
less likely to terminate their campaigns.6
No matter how many candidates are competitive during a campaign, all but one
will lose a given nomination contest. As noted earlier, it usually becomes clear
fairly early on who will be the party’s eventual nominee (Adkins and Dowdle
2001a, b; Cohen et al. 2008; Steger 2008; Steger et al. 2004). Other candidates can
remain competitive in the sense that they attract significant vote shares and win
meaningful numbers of delegates, but they will ultimately lose to the frontrunner.
As it becomes clearer who will win the nomination, other candidates will be more
likely to drop out of the race. The benefit of possibly winning the nomination
obviously dwindles as it becomes clear to a candidate that s/he will lose. Moreover,
once the outcome of a nomination race is clear, the profile-raising benefit diminishes
as elite and voter interest wanes and the party-related costs increase. In light of these
considerations, our final hypothesis is that as uncertainty about the outcome of a
nomination race fades, all trailing candidates will be more likely to terminate their
campaigns.7
5

Aldrich (1980, p. 113) raises the importance of field size in presidential nomination contests by
suggesting that the ‘‘greater the number of active candidates at the outset, the greater the instability. The
more candidates there are, the greater the role of the dynamics of the primary and caucus system in
reducing the number of candidates’’.
6

Prior research suggests that candidates’ ability to raise and maintain adequate cash reserves is highly
correlated with other variables in our model such as poll standing, candidate characteristics, and
likelihood of winning the nomination (e.g., Aldrich 1980; Damore 1997; Haynes et al. 2004). We return
to this point below.

7

The logic underlying this hypothesis is consistent with research examining the consequences of
frontloading on the dynamics of nomination campaigns. For example, Mayer and Busch (2004) argue that
frontloading causes nominees to effectively capture the nomination after only a few contests. Thus,
because the frontloading of primaries increases the speed at which the winner of a nomination campaign
is determined, frontloading causes uncertainty about the eventual outcome to more quickly dissipate. This
hypothesis also harks back to some of the seminal presidential nomination campaign research that tended
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Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses regarding the length of presidential nomination bids, we
collected data on nomination contests from 1980 to 2008. We exclude all the races
in which an incumbent president seeks reelection, as these campaigns often are
uncontested (i.e., 1996 Democrats; 2004 Republicans) or attract few competitors
(i.e., 1980 Democrats; 1992 Republicans).8 Thus, we analyze data from eleven
nomination campaigns (the 1984, 1988, 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008 Democratic
campaigns and the 1980, 1988, 1996, 2000, and 2008 Republican campaigns).
For these campaigns, we next need to determine which candidates should be
included in the analysis. However, as Steger et al. (2004) note, deciding which
candidates to include and which to exclude is not straightforward given that dozens
of individuals register as a candidate with the Federal Election Commission. For our
analysis, we include all candidates who demonstrated a minimal level of support
(i.e., a non-zero percent of support) in pre-campaign Gallup or Harris polls and
formally contested at least one delegate-determining contest.9
The Dependent Variable
For each candidate in our data, we are interested in the length of time s/he stayed in
the race before withdrawing. Put differently, we are interested in explaining the
timing of these withdrawals. As such, these data should be considered duration data
(see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). A number of our independent variables
vary as a campaign progresses and we thus structure our data so that there is an
observation of each candidate for each day that they remain in the nomination race.
We include a dummy variable noting whether the candidate in question withdrew
from the race on that particular day.
A key issue with duration data is identifying the points at which time starts and
stops. The starting points of nomination campaigns are not easy to define or
observe; a point exacerbated by a lack of consensus in the literature. We use the day
after the Iowa caucus as the starting point of our analysis. While candidates actively
Footnote 7 continued
to highlight the instability and uncertainty stemming from the dynamic nature of nomination campaigns
(e.g., Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1988). In contrast, more recent work emphasizes the stability and predictability of the outcomes of recent post-reform campaigns (e.g., Adkins and Dowdle 2001a, b; Cohen et al.
2008; Steger et al. 2004).
8

While the 1980 Democratic and 1992 Republican campaigns did feature spirited challenges to sitting
presidents, the dynamics of these races are different from campaigns not featuring incumbents (Aldrich
1980) and thus are excluded from the analysis presented here.

9

The candidates included in our analysis are: 1980 (R)—Anderson, Baker, Bush, Connally, Crane, Dole,
Reagan; 1984 (D)—Askew, Babbitt, Cranston, Glenn, Hart, Hollings, Jackson, McGovern, Mondale;
1988 (D)—Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, Hart, Jackson, Simon; 1988 (R)—Bush, Dole, DuPont, Haig, Kemp,
Robertson; 1992 (D)—Brown, Clinton, Harkin, Kerrey, Tsongas; 1996 (R)—Alexander, Buchanan, Dole,
Dornan, Forbes, Gramm, Keyes, Lugar, Taylor; 2000 (D)—Bradley, Gore; 2000 (R)—Bauer, Bush,
Forbes, Hatch, Keyes, McCain; 2004 (D)—Clark, Dean, Edwards, Gephardt, Kerry, Kucinich,
Lieberman, Sharpton; 2008 (D)—Biden, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Kucinich, Obama, Richardson;
2008 (R)—Giuliani, Huckabee, Hunter, Keyes, McCain, Paul, Romney, Thompson.
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campaign well in advance of the Iowa caucus, most candidates withdraw at some
point after the first contest. Moreover, many of our hypotheses are focused on the
events occurring during the delegate gathering phase of the nomination process.10
More importantly, this criterion provides a clear demarcation between the unofficial
‘‘invisible’’ or ‘‘money’’ primary, which may extend for years, and the process that
actually determines nominees. We do not dispute that important activity occurs
during the former phase of the campaign. Ultimately, however, if candidates choose
not to contest any of their party’s delegates, it is difficult to argue that they are
actually running for the nomination. Thus, excluded from the analysis are any
candidates who withdrew prior to Iowa.11 This leaves 74 candidates in our data, for
a total of 4,532 days at risk of campaign termination.
The point at which the duration of a candidacy ends is easier to identify. We
consider a candidacy to have ended when the candidate formally withdraws from
the race or suspends his or her campaign. There are candidates who never drop out
of the race, including the eventual nominee and losing candidates who choose not to
exit the race. We handle these candidates by right-censoring the data at the day after
the last primary election.12 Duration models are designed to handle right-censored
data so this feature of our data should not prove problematic.
We are interested in explaining variation in how long candidates stay in a
nomination race and duration models are well-suited for this task. We estimate a
semi-parametric Cox model, which makes no assumptions about the nature of the
baseline hazard function.13 We estimate robust standard errors that allow residuals
to be correlated across the multiple observations associated with a given candidate.
We also stratify the model by election cycle, which allows each election cycle to
have its own baseline hazard function. This stratification should account for election
cycle-specific heterogeneity.14
To be clear, the Cox model estimates the effect of our independent variables on
the hazard rate of a candidate withdrawing from the race on a given day (time t). A
hazard rate is analogous to a probability, although it does not have an upper bound.
The hazard of a candidate withdrawing from the race is directly linked to length of
the candidate’s time spent campaigning for the nomination. As the hazard rate
increases, the expected duration of a candidacy decreases.

10
For instance, it is not clear how to handle variables such as Contest Distance and Delegate Distance if
we included time before the Iowa caucus in our analysis.
11
This decision means that we cannot draw inferences from our analysis regarding the behavior of
candidates who withdraw before the Iowa caucus. Presumably the candidates who do not drop out before
Iowa are not representative of those who do. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that most candidates
do not drop out before Iowa and thus our conclusions account for the behavior of most candidates.
12

For the 2000 Democratic nomination campaign, observations for Al Gore are right-censored on the
day that his one competitor (Bradley) dropped out. From this point on, it is not reasonable to assume that
there is a non-zero hazard of Gore dropping out of the race.
13

See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for an overview of duration models, including the Cox
model.

14

AIC and BIC statistics indicate a clear improvement in model fit when the Cox model is stratified.

123

166

Polit Behav (2010) 32:157–180

Independent Variables
Our hypotheses point towards the inclusion of several independent variables in our
duration model. Name Recognition is a poll-based measure of the candidate’s level
of name recognition at the start of the campaign.15 We expect Name Recognition to
have a positive coefficient estimate, indicating that it increases the hazard of a
candidate withdrawing from the race, all else equal.
To measure Media Coverage, we utilize the Vanderbilt Television News Archive
to determine the daily number of network news stories mentioning each candidate in
our data. To smooth these data out a bit, we sum the number of stories mentioning a
candidate over the previous seven days. For each day in each campaign, we identify
the candidate with the largest number of stories over the prior seven days and set
Media Coverage at 100 for this candidate. For all the other candidates in the race,
Media Coverage equals the number of stories mentioning the candidate (over the
past seven days) divided by the number of stories for the most-covered candidate
(then multiplied by 100 to make this a percentage). Media Coverage is thus a
measure of a candidate’s relative amount of media coverage over the prior week.16
This variable should have a negative coefficient.
Measuring how connected a candidate is to his or her party is less straightforward. We begin by coding whether a candidate has served as a member of Congress
(Member of Congress) or has held another major political office such as governor or
cabinet head (Other Major Office).17 We assume that candidates falling into either
of these categories are, on average, more connected to their party than candidates
who do not. The coefficient estimate for each of these dummy variables should be
positive, indicating that these candidates with tighter connections to their parties
should have a higher risk of dropping out of the race on a given day, all else equal.
For candidates who have served in Congress, we have additional information on
how close they are to their party. Utilizing first-dimension Common Space scores
(Poole 1998), we calculate how many standard deviations away a candidate is from
the relevant party mean (including all party members in both chambers) in the
15
Specifically, we use Gallup poll results for the question ‘‘have you heard something about’’ a given
candidate. When this question is asked multiple times during the pre-primary phase, we use the earliest
poll results. 10 of our 74 candidates were not included in these polls. Seven of these 10 candidates are in
the 2008 data. For most of these candidates, we used the average level of name recognition for candidates
who served in the same level of office. For Dodd in 2008, for example, we use the average name
recognition for the senators in our data. For Keyes in 2000 and 2008 we use his name recognition in 1996.
For Taylor in 1996, we use the lowest value of name recognition found in our data. Given that most of
these imputed values occur in the 2008 cycle, we estimated our model without the 2008 data and find that
the estimate (and standard error) for Name Recognition is very stable, implying that the imputation of
missing values does not affect the results for this variable.
16

It might be useful to consider the substantive content of these news stories (e.g., whether they provide
positive or negative coverage of the candidate or focus on policy versus the horse race) but it is not
feasible to content analyze all the news stories for the eleven election cycles analyzed here (there are
more than 10,000 mentions of candidates in network news stories during the nomination contests included
in our analysis). Haynes et al. (2004) perform this type of content analysis, but their data is limited to the
2000 Republican campaign.
17
Of the 74 candidates in our data, 48 (64.9%) had been members of Congress, 12 (16.2%) had held
another major office (such as governor), and 14 (18.9%) had never held any type of significant office.
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election year in question. Candidates with a greater Ideological Deviation from their
fellow partisans in Congress can be considered as being less connected to the party
mainstream and thus we expect the estimate for this variable to be negative in
direction.
For a candidate who has not served in Congress but has been elected governor,
we utilize the Common Space scores for the relevant state’s congressional
delegation to predict a score for the candidate (see Steger 2008). Appendix 1 details
this measurement strategy. For a candidate who has not served in Congress, but has
held a cabinet position, we use the Common Space score for the appointing
president.18 As above, we use these predicted Common Space scores to determine a
candidate’s Ideological Deviation from fellow partisans in Congress.19
To measure how well a candidate has faired in electoral contests at a given point
in time, we utilize the results from the most recent primary election and subtract the
candidate’s percentage of the vote from the winner’s percentage. If more than one
primary election were held on a given day, we average the results. We also include
Iowa caucus first round results in this measure. Other caucuses are not included.20
We use the distance measure instead of raw election results because it provides a
better gauge as to how the candidate performed. Winning 20% of the vote is
18

It should be safe to assume that cabinet appointees, on average, will reflect the ideological orientation
of the president. There will be some measurement error associated with this approach, though. Is there a
systematic bias introduced by this measurement error? The typical approach used to test whether
predicted or imputed values for a variable introduce a bias is to include a dummy variable in the model
indicating that the observation has an imputed value for the variable in question. Other Major Office is
exactly this sort of variable. It equals one for all candidates for whom we have predicted a Common
Space score. Any systematic bias introduced by the imputation will be corrected by the inclusion of this
variable.
19

For candidates who never served in Congress or held a major office, Ideological Deviation is set at
zero as we are not confident that we can properly place them on the Common Space scale. The selection
of zero is inconsequential because the Member of Congress and Other Major Office dummy variables
differentiate observations in which Ideological Deviation equals zero for candidates who are perfectly inline with their party’s mean from observations in which Ideological Deviation equals zero for candidates
for whom we have no basis for measuring their ideological position (e.g., those who have never held
elective or appointive office). If we select different values of Ideological Deviation for the candidates for
whom Member of Congress and Other Major Office equal zero, the results of our model estimation are
unaffected.
An alterative approach would be to use Cohen et al.’s (2008) expert assessments of the ideological
location of these non-office holders (which forces us to exclude the non-office holders of the 2008
campaign since they are not included in Cohen et al.’s data). We re-oriented Cohen et al.’s scale to match
that of the Common Space scores and multiplied the scores (which range from -1 to 1) by .849 to ensure
that the most ideologically extreme candidates (those at either 1 or -1) were equivalent to the most
ideologically extreme member of Congress during this time period. We then generated Ideological
Deviation for these candidates and re-estimated our models. In both models, the estimate for Ideological
Deviation remains negative and significant. The estimates for Member of Congress and Other Major
Office decrease in size but remain positive in direction. They are no longer statistically significant, but
that is to be expected given that with this specification Ideological Deviation now captures the fact that
non-office holders typically deviate more from the center of their party. In sum, using this alternative
measurement strategy leads to the same inference—the less connected a candidate is to his or her party
the less likely they are to drop out of the race on a given day.
20
Caucuses provide more ambiguous signals about a candidate’s competitiveness given the multi-stage
nature of these processes. Delegates selected by caucuses are included in our measure of Delegate Count
Distance.
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impressive if it is the highest vote total (and thus Contest Distance equals zero) but
is unimpressive if the winner won 60%. We expect that as Contest Distance
increases, the hazard of withdrawing will increase. It is important to point out that
the value this variable takes on will change over time for a given candidate.21 Akin
to Haynes et al. (2004), we measure Delegate Count Distance as the percentage of
the allocated delegates the candidate in question has won through time t (as reported
by CQ Weekly Reports) and subtract it from the percentage won by the candidate
with the most delegates. The greater Delegate Count Distance, the more likely it is
that the candidate will exit the race.
We also include several independent variables that are prospective indicators of
competitiveness. Field Size should increase the hazard of terminating a candidacy
and is simply the number of candidates in the race at time t. Poll Distance is
generated in the same manner as Contest Distance, except here we use the most
recent national poll results (Gallup or Harris).22 Again, this variable will change
over time for a candidate as his or her poll standing (and that of the leader) changes.
We expect these variables to have positive coefficient estimates.
To measure Cash on Hand, we start by determining a candidate’s cash on hand at
the start of the month under analysis, as reported to the Federal Election
Commission. We then identify the candidate in the race with the largest amount of
cash on hand for that time period. Cash on Hand equals a candidate’s cash on hand
divided by the largest amount of cash on hand at that point in time (multiplied by
100 to make this a percentage).23 Thus, if the candidate with the largest amount of
cash on hand has five million dollars, a candidate with two million dollars has a
Cash on Hand of 40. The candidate with the largest amount of cash on hand has a
value of 100 for this variable. As this variable increases, we expect the hazard of a
candidate withdrawing to decrease (i.e., we expect a negative coefficient).
Certainty of Losing is the log of the percentage of the delegates needed to
secure the nomination that has been won by the candidate who is the delegate
leader.24 This variable equals zero for candidates who are leading in the delegate
count, as they are not at all certain that they will lose. Certainty of Losing should
have a positive coefficient. The clearer it is that candidates are not the nomination
the more likely they are to withdraw. Note that this variable captures the influence
of frontloading on candidates’ exit decisions (e.g., Mayer and Busch 2004). For
earlier, less frontloaded races in the dataset, this variable increases at a much
slower rate; reflecting the greater spacing between individual contests over time
and thus, the longer time period required for the frontrunner to accrue the
21
For data on primary and caucus results, as well as delegate totals, we primarily rely on CQ Weekly
Reports.
22
We utilize Gallup and Harris polls in which the sample is limited to people who identify themselves as
being a member of the party in question or who identify themselves as being independents.
23
We standardize this variable by the maximum amount of cash on hand in order to account for
differences in the amounts of money involved in primary campaigns across the election cycles included in
our analysis. Norrander (2006) adopts the same approach.
24
We log this variable with the assumption that a one-unit change in this variable at its low range will
matter more than a one-unit change when the frontrunner has almost won the necessary amount of
delegates.
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requisite delegates. For more recent campaigns, where frontloading has been
heightened, Certainty of Losing increases more rapidly due to the greater number
of individual contests early in the process that allow the frontrunner to more
quickly obtain the delegates necessary to secure the nomination.

Results
The results of our initial estimation of the stratified Cox model (Model 1) are
reported in the first column of Table 1. The independent variables are jointly
significant in the statistical sense and most are individually significant.25 Given the
manner in which Cox models are parameterized, a positive coefficient estimate
indicates that an independent variable increases the hazard of a candidate ending
their candidacy at time t. Since the duration of a campaign is inversely related to the
hazard of a candidate withdrawing on a given day, a positive coefficient indicates
that an independent variable decreases the expected duration of a candidacy.
Turning to the parameter estimates of interest, we argue that candidates will stay
in the race longer if they have more to gain in terms of raising their profile. The
coefficient estimate for Name Recognition in Model 1 is in the direction we
hypothesize and is statistically significant. A candidate’s initial level of name
recognition has a positive effect on the hazard of that candidate withdrawing at time
t. Candidates with lower levels of name recognition are less likely to drop out on a
given day and thus have longer candidacies, all else equal. It appears that candidates
are motivated to stay in the race by the possibility of increasing their profile, with an
eye towards improving their future political role or career. However, the estimate
for Media Coverage is neither statistically significant nor in the expected
direction.26 Thus, while a candidate’s initial level of name recognition affects
how long they remain in the race, recent media coverage of the candidate does not
decrease his or her likelihood of withdrawing.
25
A number of scholars argue that ideological heterogeneity in the Democratic Party and the party’s
tendency to award delegates in a more proportional manner causes Democratic nomination campaigns to
be longer and more contentious as compared to Republican nomination campaigns (Ansolabehere and
King 1990; David and Ceaser 1980; Kamarck and Goldstein 1994). To assess whether it is appropriate to
pool together Democratic and Republican candidates into a single model, we performed a Chow test
which involved interacting all the independent variables with a dummy variable indicating whether the
candidate is a Democrat and then including all of these interactions in our model. None of these
interaction terms had a statistically significant coefficient. Moreover, a Wald test of the entire set of
interaction terms leads us to fail to reject the null hypothesis that the interaction terms have no
explanatory power (p = .72). These results provide compelling evidence that it is appropriate to pool the
Democratic and Republican candidates together into a single model. Also, note that these null results for
the party difference hypothesis are consistent with Norrander (2006). As such, it appears that Republican
also-rans behave no differently than their Democratic counterparts when deciding whether to terminate or
continue their candidacies; a conclusion that contrasts with recent work (Cohen et al. 2008; Steger 2008)
suggesting that the Republican Party is more likely than the Democratic Party to coalesce around a
favorite. Thus, while there may be party asymmetries with respect to establishing frontrunners, similar
inter-party dynamics do not appear to affect the exit calculus.
26
This null result remains if we interact Media Coverage with Name Recognition. Even candidates with
low levels of name recognition do not appear to consider media coverage when deciding whether to
withdraw from the race.
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Table 1 Cox model of candidate withdrawal from presidential nomination campaigns, 1980–2008
Independent variable

Model 1

Model 2

.023*

.028*

Profile-raising benefit
Name recognition
Media coverage

(.011)

(.011)

.009

.018

(.008)

(.010)

2.99*

3.04*

Party-related cost
Member of Congress

(.733)

(.721)

Other major office

3.28*

3.08*

(.800)

(.756)

Ideological deviation

-.990*

-.940*

(.264)

(.262)

.006

-.001

Competitiveness
Contest distance

(.012)

(.017)

Contest distance 9 Iowa

–

.094*

Contest distance 9 New Hampshire

–

.212*

Delegate count distance

.007

.009

(.012)

(.012)

Field size

1.55*

1.65*

(.036)
(.094)

Poll distance
Cash on hand

(.430)

(.449)

.138*

.156*

(.026)

(.029)

.006

.003

(.006)

(.005)

.611*

.590*

(.158)

(.157)

Candidates

74

74

Total days at risk

4,532

4,532

Wald test (chi-squared, 11, 13 d.f.)

60.9*

60.8*

Certainty of losing

* p B .05 (one-tailed test). The model is stratified by election cycle, allowing the baseline hazard to vary
for each cycle. Entries are coefficient estimates with accompanying robust standard errors in parentheses

We also contend that candidates vary in how much they care whether staying in
the race for a lengthy period of time causes any potential harm to their reputation
within the party or eventual nominee’s success in the general election. The results of
Model 1 are consistent with our theoretical expectations as it appears that candidates
who are connected to their party terminate their campaigns more quickly than those
less connected to their party’s mainstream. The positive and statistically significant
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estimates for Member of Congress and Other Major Office reveal that candidates
who have held significant political positions have a greater hazard of exiting the
race at time t than candidates who have not held any sort of major office and are thus
presumably less connected to the party.
In addition, the result for Ideological Deviation indicates that candidates who
deviate from their party’s mean ideological position in Congress are less likely to
drop out at time t than candidates who are in the ideological mainstream of the
party. As we argue above, this is the case because it is less costly for party outsiders
to engage in lengthy, losing candidacies than it is for party insiders. Steger (2008)
finds that ideologically extreme candidates get more primary election votes than
would otherwise be expected. Our results suggest that these candidates also stay in
the race longer, even once any competitive advantages are controlled for.
Turning next to the variables assessing the influence of competitiveness on
candidacy duration, the results of Model 1 provide little initial support for the
importance of retrospective indicators of competitiveness in shaping a candidate’s
decision to remain in the race or withdraw. The estimates for Contest Distance and
Delegate Count Distance are in the predicted direction (positive), but are not
statistically significant.27 It thus appears that recent electoral results and the
allocation of delegates have surprisingly little influence on the decision to exit from
a presidential nomination campaign. Below, we revisit the result for Contest
Distance.
The results for Field Size and Poll Distance suggest that prospective evaluations
of future competitiveness do influence a candidate’s decision to remain in the race.
Consistent with Aldrich (1980), the larger the Field Size at time t the shorter the
length of time the candidate will stay in the race, all else equal. The estimate for
Poll Distance reveals that the further behind the leader a candidate is, the more
likely it is that s/he will drop out of the nomination contest. Cash on Hand, however,
does not exert a significant effect. This interesting result (one that we further discuss
below) implies that being successful in raising money does not translate into longer
candidacies, once other indicators of competitiveness and candidate motivation are
controlled for in the model.28
Not surprisingly, Certainty of Losing has a positive and significant coefficient
estimate, revealing that as it becomes increasingly clear that trailing candidates will
not ultimately win the nomination they become more likely to drop out. This result,
in conjunction with the insignificant estimate for Delegate Count Distance, implies
that candidates care about how close the frontrunner is to securing the nomination,
not how far behind the frontrunner they are in the delegate totals. This result is
27
The result for Contest Distance is sensitive to the inclusion of the 2008 candidates. If these candidates
are excluded, the estimate for Contest Distance is positive and statistically significant and the interaction
terms involving Iowa and New Hampshire are insignificant. None of the other results are similarly
sensitive.
28
This null result remains if we include a candidate’s relative amount of fundraising (i.e., receipts during
that time period) in addition to or instead of Cash on Hand. We also considered the possibility that it is
the change in the amount of money a candidate has that matters. For each candidate, we calculated the
percentage change in the amount of cash on hand from the prior month to the month in question. Again,
the resulting estimate indicates that fundraising success does not cause candidates to extend their
candidacies.
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compatible with Norrander’s (2000) conclusion that the competition for a
nomination ends once the frontrunner has won a substantial proportion of the
necessary delegates. This result also subsumes the commonly made argument that
frontloading shortens the length of candidacies during the nomination phase of an
election year. In a front-loaded campaign, the eventual losers become more quickly
aware of their fates.
Reconsidering Contest Distance
One conventional wisdom regarding nomination campaigns is that the Iowa caucus
and New Hampshire primary play a disproportionate role in determining nomination
outcomes and the length of campaigns (e.g., Adkins and Dowdle 2001a; Steger et al.
2004). To test whether these two specific electoral contests might affect the decision
to withdraw from the race, we estimated our model a second time including two
interaction terms. The first consists of Contest Distance and a dummy variable
indicating whether the most recent contest in question is the Iowa caucuses (Iowa).
The second consists of Contest Distance and a dummy variable indicating whether
the most recent contest is the New Hampshire primary (New Hampshire). These
interaction terms allow us to assess whether these two events play a role in
determining whether candidates drop out, even though Contest Distance generally
does not appear to influence this decision.29
The results from this model estimation (Model 2) are reported in the second
column of Table 1. The coefficient estimates for the two interaction terms are
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the results of the Iowa caucus and
New Hampshire primary influence the decision to remain in the race or withdraw.
While Contest Distance generally does not have any influence on candidacy
duration, the results of these two specific contests do affect candidacy duration. The
worse that a candidate does in either of these contests, as compared to the winner, the
more likely it is that this candidate will withdraw from the race. The substantive
inferences for the other independent variables are the same as in Model 1.
To get a better substantive feel for these effects, we generate predicted hazard
rates for candidates dropping out of the race. Figure 1 presents predicted hazards
(using Model 2) on the y-axis while Contest Distance varies on the x-axis. Three
curves are plotted: the first for hazards when Iowa equals one (i.e., the most recent
contest result is that of the Iowa caucus), the second for hazards when New
Hampshire equals one (i.e., the most recent contest result is that of the New
Hampshire primary), and the third for hazards when both these dummy variables
equal zero (the most recent contest result is from a subsequent primary). For the
Iowa hazards, the baseline hazard is set to its mean value for the week after this
caucus. For the New Hampshire hazards, the baseline hazard is set to its mean value
for the week after this primary. For the Other Contests hazards, the baseline hazard
is set to its mean value for all other campaign days.30
29
We do not need to include Iowa and New Hampshire separately in the model because these ‘‘main
effects’’ are absorbed into the election cycle-specific baseline hazard.
30

All other independent variables are set at their means.
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Fig. 1 Effect of Contest Distance on the hazard of withdrawing from the race. Note: All other
independent variables are held at their mean values. For the Iowa hazards, the baseline hazard is set to its
mean value for the week after this caucus. For the New Hampshire hazards, the baseline hazard is set to
its mean value for the week after this primary. For the Other Contests hazards, the baseline hazard is set to
its mean value for all other days

The plotted hazards associated with days following the post-New Hampshire
contests (the Other Contests hazards) show that candidates are generally more likely
to drop out after these subsequent primaries. However, the results of these later
contests do not appear to affect the hazard of withdrawing (the hazards appear to
decrease slightly as Contest Distance increases, but based on the insignificant
coefficient estimate for this variable we cannot conclude that this slope is truly
negative). In contrast, the worse a candidate does in the Iowa caucus or New
Hampshire primary, the greater the hazard of withdrawing from the race. The
relatively flat curve for the Iowa caucus results, however, suggests that candidates’
performances in Iowa relative to the winner do not exert much of a substantive
effect on the exit decision despite the statistically significant coefficient for the
Contest Distance 9 Iowa interaction. The steep increase in the hazard for the New
Hampshire primary indicates that candidates’ performances in the Granite State
have strong substantive effects on their hazard of withdrawing from the race.
Similarly, we can more clearly assess the substantive effects for party-related
costs by generating predicted hazard rates (from Model 2) for candidates dropping
out of the race as a function of variation in party connectedness and Ideological
Deviation (implicitly conditioned by whether we have a measure of this variable for
the candidate). Figure 2 plots three sets of hazard rates: one for candidates who
served in Congress, one for candidates who have served in another major office, and
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Fig. 2 Effect of party-related costs on the hazard of withdrawing from the race. Note: All other
independent variables and the baseline hazard rate are held at their means

one for candidates who have never held any kind of major office. The full observed
range of Ideological Deviation is plotted on the x-axis.31 As discussed above,
Ideological Deviation does not vary for candidates who never held a major office
and the hazards for this candidate type are therefore flat.
This figure reveals that those who have not held elective office (i.e., party
outsiders) generally have low likelihoods of dropping out on a given day, all else
equal. In contrast, candidates who have held office typically have a greater hazard of
withdrawing from the race; reflecting the greater party related costs that these
candidates may face for continuing an unsuccessful bid for their party’s nomination.
At the same time, this effect is not constant. Rather, Ideological Deviation exerts a
negative effect on the hazard rates for office holders. Indeed, office-holding
candidates who are ideological outliers appear to have very similar hazards to those
who have never held major office.
The Role of Money
While the results presented above are largely consistent with our theoretical
expectations, these results diverge from some of the conventional wisdom regarding
nomination campaigns, as well as the findings of prior research on the winnowing
process. For instance, in her analysis of the length of time that candidates remain in
the race for a nomination, Norrander (2006) focuses on the role of money and finds
31

All other independent variables and the baseline hazard are held at their means.
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that it has a quadratic relationship with the length of candidacies. Well-funded and
poorly funded candidates stay in the race for a long time while moderately funded
candidates exit earlier. We find that cash reserves do not exert a simple linear effect
on the duration of a candidacy, but have we misspecified our model in this respect?
We suspect the answer is no. Norrander’s results are likely a function of party
outsiders often being poorly funded and, as we argue, less likely to drop out early
since lengthy losing candidacies are less costly to them. Similarly, candidates with
low levels of name recognition stay in the race longer, and are probably less
successful in raising money. Since we account for the degree to which a candidate is
connected to his or her party as well as name recognition, it seems there is little
reason to expect money to exert a curvilinear effect. Nonetheless, we also estimated
our model while including the square of Cash on Hand. Under this specification the
estimates for both Cash on Hand and its square are statistically insignificant,
supporting our suspicion that once profile-raising benefits and party-related costs are
controlled for money should not exert a curvilinear effect on the hazard of
withdrawing from the race.
The null finding regarding the role of campaign money is interesting in its own
right, given the importance typically attached to fundraising. We are certainly not
willing to go so far as to conclude that money is irrelevant to nomination campaigns.
Indeed, one reason for our results may be that for many candidates fundraising, poll
standings, and electoral performance are closely intertwined (Damore 1997). Thus,
while candidates’ ability to raise money may be a precursor to other factors shaping
candidates’ decision making, fundraising in and of itself may not directly influence
how long a candidate remains active in a nomination campaign, all else equal (also
see Cohen et al. 2008).32
Is the Duration of a Candidacy Determined Before the Iowa Caucus?
Recent research (e.g., Adkins and Dowdle 2001b; Cohen et al. 2008; Steger 2008)
suggests that activity during the invisible primary has significant effects on
determining the winners and losers of presidential nomination campaigns. Does the
same hold for the exit process? While our model does include a time-constant

32
The possibility that there are relationships between our independent variables (including Cash on
Hand) does not lead to endogeneity concerns, at least in the traditional version of endogeneity (in which
an independent variable correlates with the error term) that causes coefficient bias. That said, it is worth
considering the relationship between the independent variables. Cash on Hand correlates with Poll
Distance, Contest Distance, and Name Recognition. Temporally speaking, Name Recognition (as we
measure it) precedes Cash on Hand. Cash on Hand generally precedes Poll Distance and Contest
Distance. However, we cannot test, with any level of rigor, what the causal relationships are between
these variables. If we had daily data on Cash on Hand (instead of monthly) and more frequent polls (a
particular problem in the earlier campaigns) we could attempt to determine Granger causality amongst
these variables. Unfortunately, the data are not sufficiently fine-grained to perform this type of analysis.
We can prevent Cash on Hand from varying over the campaign (holding it fixed at its value on January 1
of election year). This guarantees that Cash on Hand is not influenced by subsequent polls and electoral
outcomes (i.e., makes it relatively exogenous to these other independent variables). When we take this
approach, the estimate for Cash on Hand is still insignificant.
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component (e.g., candidate characteristics indicating connection to the party), our
argument regarding perceptions of competitiveness and the certainty of losing the
nomination points towards a more dynamic (or time-varying, to use duration
terminology) view of nomination campaigns. We find that the duration of a
candidacy is explained by several variables that change in value as the campaign
progresses. Specifically, Field Size, Poll Distance, and Certainty of Losing are all
time varying and are all significant predictors of the length of a candidacy. In light
of the performance of these variables, it appears that what occurs during the
delegate-allocating phase of the nomination process plays a significant role in the
length of time that candidates remain active. Or put differently, how long candidates
choose to contest their party’s nomination is not determined by what occurs prior to
the Iowa caucuses.
There is, however, the possibility that variation in Poll Distance and Field Size
across candidates and election cycles, respectively, explains the hazard of exiting
the race. In other words, it could be the case that the static components of these two
variables have the explanatory power, not the dynamic components that change over
time for a given candidate. To test this possibility, we estimated our model with two
additional independent variables that do not vary over the course of a campaign:
Initial Poll Distance and Initial Field Size at the time of the Iowa caucus. With these
controls in place, the estimates for Poll Distance and Field Size remain statistically
significant. These results indicate that static components of these two variables are
not driving the coefficient estimates. The expected duration of a candidacy changes
from day-to-day in a dynamic manner, instead of being fixed at the start of the
campaign.

Conclusion
The purpose of this research is to explain candidates’ decisions to drop out of U.S.
presidential nomination contests. The three components of our argument are that the
decision to remain in the race or withdraw is a function of the mix of two
motivations (winning the nomination and profile-raising), the degree to which a
candidate is connected to his or her party, and assessments of competitiveness. The
results of our duration analysis of presidential nomination campaigns from 1980 to
2008 are largely consistent with our argument as we find that the decisions of
presidential aspirants to continue or terminate their candidacies are shaped by the
desire to raise their profiles, the potential party costs they may face for continuing a
campaign after the eventual nominee has emerged, and by prospective and
retrospective indicators of their competitiveness. Our results, however, provide no
support for the role of cash on hand or media coverage in affecting candidates’
decision to continue or end their campaigns.
Although the winnowing process is central to our understanding of presidential
nomination campaigns, the relative dearth of prior systematic research on this
phenomenon is surprising. Building upon prior scholarship, we have sought to move
our understanding of this process forward on a number of fronts. Empirically, we
see two notable contributions from our effort. First, by utilizing data from eleven
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campaigns, including 2008, we are able to develop a more general understanding of
the factors underlying candidates’ exit decisions. Second and as noted above, we
develop a dynamic theoretical framework that allows candidates’ prospective and
retrospective evaluations of their competitive standing vis-à-vis their opponents to
be continually updated over the course of a campaign and consistent with Haynes
et al. (2004) and Norrander (2006), we evaluate these hypotheses using dynamic
statistical techniques.
Perhaps more importantly, we have sought to capture the multiple motivations
that underlie presidential candidacies and explain how this goal seeking behavior is
tempered by the dynamics of the nomination process and the value that candidates
attach to their reputations within their parties. To be sure, many of these
considerations have been suggested by prior research (e.g., Norrander 2006; Steger
et al. 2004), but we refine these arguments and develop more objective and precise
indicators of candidates’ pre-campaign profiles than the fairly blunt candidate
classifications previously used (i.e., big shots versus long shots, careerists versus
advocacy, or traditional versus non-traditional). Our results suggest that the
motivations underlying a candidacy affect the decision to remain active in a
nomination campaign. The degree to which candidates are tied to their party also
plays an important role in determining candidacy duration.
Ultimately, our analysis provides a mix of good and bad news for those
concerned with the process by which presidential nominees are selected. One
common lament is that the outcome of the nomination process is largely
predetermined by party elites and other ‘‘policy demanders’’ prior to the delegate
allocating phase (Cohen et al. 2008). As a consequence, in most campaigns, the preIowa frontrunner goes on to win the nomination (Adkins and Dowdle 2000, 2001a,
b; Cohen et al. 2008). With respect to this concern, our results indicate that many
candidates behave as if the outcome of the campaign is not predetermined and
instead, respond to the ongoing dynamics of the campaign. More to the point, one of
the novel components of our argument and analysis involves the level of certainty
that a candidate has that someone else will become the party’s nominee. We treat
this level of certainty as varying over the campaign and our results indicate that this
variable has an important effect on the decision to withdraw from the race. In
addition, our results suggest that the winnowing process is driven more by national
public opinion than by campaign resources. It appears that candidates are more
likely to stay in the race when they are currently polling well, regardless of their
available resources or how well they polled before the Iowa caucus.
Another potentially positive implication of our analyses is of an informational
nature. Candidates who are not well-known at the start of the campaign tend to stay
in the race longer. These lengthier candidacies presumably provide voters, activists,
fellow politicians, and the media a better opportunity to learn about these
candidates. This information may or may not be particularly useful at the time, but
candidates who are able to use nomination campaigns to raise their profiles are
likely to play significant political and policy making roles in the future.
The potential bad news is that there is a bias to the winnowing process that may
be less than ideal. Candidates closely connected to their party drop out more quickly
than those who are party outsiders. Thus, voters in states with later contests may end
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up choosing from a field in which there are a few insurgent-style candidates and
only one candidate (the frontrunner) from their party’s mainstream. Moreover,
given the effect of our Certainty of Losing variable, it appears that frontloading only
works to exacerbate these dynamics.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Appendix 1: Predicting Common Space Scores for Governors
In order to determine the degree to which a candidate is in the ideological
mainstream of his or her party (Ideological Deviation), we utilize Common
Space scores. We need to generate these scores for the candidates who have
served as a governor, instead of as a member of Congress (see Steger 2008). We
make the assumption that politicians elected to statewide office reflect the policy
preferences of their party within the state, as well as the state in general. For
instance, the ideology for a Democratic governor of Florida should have an ideal
point somewhere between that of the average Florida voter and the average
Democrat in Florida. To estimate this value, the ideology of the Florida
congressional delegation should provide useful information about both central
tendencies. Specifically, we can utilize the average Common Space score for a
member of the Florida delegation at the time the governor was last elected, as
well as the average score for the Democratic delegation from Florida at that
time.
To assess how good of a job these two types of delegation means do in
predicting the ideology of a statewide office holder, we used Common Space data
for the 97th through 109th Congresses and regressed the first Common Space
dimension for U.S. senators on (1) the average first dimension score for House
members who are from the senator’s party and state and (2) the average first
dimension score for all House members from the senator’s state. The resulting
model explains a remarkable 87% of the variation in senators’ Common Space
scores and both coefficient estimates are statistically significant (the estimates are
.876 and .195, respectively). We then use these estimates to predict the Common
Space scores for the seven candidates in our analysis who have been elected
governor. The predicted scores are (from liberal to conservative): Howard Dean
(-.506), Jerry Brown (-.444), Michael Dukakis (-.406), Bill Clinton (-.250),
Rubin Askew (-.140), Ronald Reagan (.212), and George W. Bush (.424). With
these predicted scores we generate our measure of Ideological Deviation, just as
we do for candidates who served in Congress.
As a robustness check, we recoded Ideological Deviation to equal zero for all
office holders who were not members of Congress and thus have imputed Common
Space scores and then estimated our models. In other words, we dropped the
imputed scores and allowed Ideological Deviation to vary only for members of
Congress. The results of this analysis are very similar to those presented in Table 1.
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The relevant coefficient estimates (standard errors) in Model 2 are 3.08 (.739) for
Congress, -1.03 (.296) for Ideological Deviation, and 2.03 (.675) for Other Major
Office.
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